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THE HOUSE ADVANTAGE: TRADE SECRET
PROTECTIONS ON THE CASINO FLOOR
1

Kevin Johnson
INTRODUCTION
As long as there have been slot machines, there have been slot cheats.
From the early days of slugs and shaving, to today’s more sophisticated
cheaters who target a machine’s programing, cheating technology has
developed in lock step with gaming technology. As a result, gaming operators
and regulators are rarely surprised by what occurs within their casinos.
However, occasionally a malicious act is so unexpected that it causes the entire
industry to react. Generally speaking, these surprises are typically new
techniques or devices that beat the machine. In July of 2013, it was who beat
the machine.
I. “2341” KEYS AND ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
On July 12, 2013, Ryan Tors, the then-director of slot operations at the
Peppermill Hotel and Casino in Reno, Nevada, was apprehended while using a
“reset” key to access the diagnostic screens of slot machines at the Grand Sierra
Resort, a local competitor.2 This “reset” key, also known across the industry as
a “2341” or a butterfly key, allows a technician to place machines in or out of
service, clear meters, or adjust a machine’s sound.3 It also allows access to the
diagnostic information, play history, logs, and game configuration of the slot
machine.4 Tors, however, was most interested in the theoretical hold percentage
and theoretical payback percentage of the games, which his key allowed him to
access.5 These settings dictate the amount that the machine will pay out over
time and are provided to operators by manufactures on a “Probability
Accounting Report,” or PAR sheet.6 As a result, they are commonly referred to

Special thanks to Chris Davis, Esq. of whose research and personal insights were
vital when writing this article.
2
Complaint at 5-6, St. Gaming Control Bd. vs. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., NGC 13–
23 (2014).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 6.
6
See E. MALCOLM GREENLEES, CASINO ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL
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as the PARs of the machine.7 To understand why he was interested in these
PARs, one must understand the trends occurring in the wider Reno market.
Long before Tors set foot inside the Grand Sierra Resort, the Reno market
had begun to flounder.8 In 2000, gaming revenues for the Reno-Sparks market
hit a peak of between 1.2 and 1.3 billion dollars.9 Over the next ten years, these
revenues would fall by nearly fifty percent.10 While there is no single reason for
this collapse, the legalization of Indian gaming in California was particularly
damaging to Reno’s casinos.11 Visitors from San Francisco and Sacramento
who previously drove to Reno now had closer, nicer alternatives to “budget
friendly” Reno.12 Moreover, gaming revenue’s downward trend accelerated
with the great recession, which brought the entire industry to its knees.13 It was
against this bleak backdrop that new ownership took over the Grand Sierra
Resort.14
Facing this threat to their market position and renewed competition, the
Peppermill decided to take action. In an effort to understand their competitor’s
strategic positions, management instructed Tors to systematically gather the
PAR information of their competitors.15 He was able to collect this information
by hacking machines throughout Reno from 2011 until he was detained by
gaming control authorities on July 12, 2013.16
As Tors was interrogated by gaming control agents, the value of this stolen
information became clear. The theoretical payout percentage dictates how
much a machine pays back over time.17 For example, if a machine’s pay out
MANAGEMENT 132–139 (1988); see also Sheryl L. Ashley, Understanding Slot
Machine Math Basics, 25 INDIAN GAMING 1, 36 (Dec. 2015), http://www.indian
gaming.com/istore/Dec15_Ashley.pdf.
7
See GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 139.
8
William R. Eadington, Analyzing the Trends in Gaming-Based Tourism for the
State of Nevada: Implications for Public Policy and Economic Development, 15
UNLV GAMING RES. & REV. J. 1, 46 (2011) [hereinafter Eadington, Analyzing the
Trends].
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
William R. Eadington, Richard H. Wells & Derek Gossi, Estimating the Impact
of California Tribal Gaming on Demand for Casino Gaming in Nevada, 14 UNLV
GAMING RES. & REV. J. 1, 44 (2010).
12
See Eadington, Analyzing the Trends, supra note 8, at 46.
13
Id.
14
See generally GSR Changes Ownership, KOLO 8 NEWS NOW (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.kolotv.com/home/headlines/Grand_Sierra_Resort_Changes_Ownership
_116774664.html.
15
See Complaint, supra note 2, at 5–6; see also Stipulation for Settlement and
Order at 1, State Gaming Control Bd. v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., NCG-13–23
(2014) (stating that Peppermill Casinos, Inc., admitted “each and every allegation
set forth in the Complaint”).
16
See Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15.
17
See Ashley, supra note 6, at 36 (noting that when discussing a similar example,
stating that a single player receiving this pay out “would most likely not be true in
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percentage is set to ninety-five percent, it will pay back $0.95 of every dollar
played into it.18 However, the average slot player does not see this kind of
return.19 These percentages govern payouts over time, not to each individual
player.20 This means that nearly everyone who plays a given machine will lose
what they bet.21 However, that machine will eventually pay out a jackpot that is
large enough to make the percentage accurate once again.22 The theoretical
hold percentage is the inverse of the theoretical payout.23 If the payout is set to
ninety-five percent, then the hold percentage is five percent.
This information for a single machine at any point in time is functionally
worthless. However, the PAR percentages of an entire casino floor or a specific
popular game across the floor can be useful information; especially if this
information is tracked and evaluated over time.24 It can indicate how “loose” or
“tight” a property is relative to another and indicate wider trends that are
occurring in the market.25 Moreover, if these percentages are known over a
length of time, a casino could gain valuable insight into its competitor’s
operational strategy and strategically position itself in the marketplace to
maximize profits.26
This possible window into the Grand Sierra Resort’s corporate strategy and
improving market position is what interested Ryan Tors and the Peppermill. In
an effort to protect the Peppermill’s position in the market, Ryan Tors had been
systematically collecting this information from his competitors for years. This
gave him the unique ability to fact-check his competitors’ marketing claims and
undermine them. When a casino claimed to be the loosest, he knew exactly

real life due to the low amount of play”).
18
Id.
19
Id. (“1. The payback percentage – this is the theoretical percentage of what the
customer should retain.”).
20
Id.
21
See GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 132 (stating that some machines pay a “single
jackpot that is sufficiently large to outweigh the lack of small payoffs,” while
others are “multiple-payoff machine[s], which may have much more frequent but
smaller payoffs”).
22
Id.
23
See Ashley, supra note 6, at 37 (“[T]he the casino reinvests the same dollar
amount regardless of the hold percentage, thereby making the reinvestment
percentages much larger on smaller theoretical holds (an inverse relationship).”);
see also GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 132 (“The payoff schedules also relate to the
use of casino hold percentages, a widely accepted procedure to be able to determine
what a slot machine should theoretically hold, based on a given number of plays
and the known reel patterns and payoff schedule.”).
24
See GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 138 (“Hold percentage is a vital management
concept in the casino and is very important in the slot machine area.”)
25
Id. at 132 (“The comparison of theoretical hold percentage and actual hold
percentage can form the basis for diagnostic and managerial analysis of slot
operating results.”)
26
Id.
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how loose they were and could react quickly. More importantly, armed with
this information, the Peppermill could know exactly how much it had to adjust
its machines to undercut the competition without lowering their hold
percentages too much and impairing profitability. For example, a nickel
machine might have four possible theoretical payout settings, 97%, 95%, 93%,
and 91%. One of the Peppermill’s competitors might claim the loosest nickel
slots in town and have its machines set at ninety-three percent. Without
knowing this setting, the only way the Peppermill could positively make the
same claim would be to set its machines to the highest possible payout settings
— in this case, ninety-seven percent. Any other setting, and the Peppermill
could not know that its advertising is accurate. However, if it knew that its
competitor set their machines to ninety-three percent and claimed to have the
loosest machines in town, the Peppermill could set its nickel slots to ninety-five
percent and take the title for itself without having to sacrifice two percent of all
its nickel slot play. In short, thanks to its casino spy, the Peppermill eliminated
much of the guesswork inherent in operating a slot floor while maximizing
their possible profits.
When Tors was finally caught and turned over to gaming control
authorities, the depth and scope of this scheme gradually began to unfold.
Through their investigation, the Gaming Control Board discovered several
important facts. First, Mr. Tors had been active in gaming properties
throughout Reno.27 Second, it became clear that Tors was acting “in the course
and scope of his employment,” and that the Peppermill Casinos’ management
“knew of, approved of, and directed Mr. Tors’ conduct of obtaining theoretical
hold percentage information from the slot machines of other casinos using a
‘reset’ key.”28 As a result of these facts, the Peppermill was fined one million
dollars, which represented the one of the largest fines ever levied by the
Nevada Gaming Commission at the time.29 The Peppermill’s electronic
espionage also led to other changes in the industry. Primarily, gaming
regulators in Nevada mandated new procedures and controls for “2341” keys
and the employees that have access to them statewide.30

In addition to the Grand Sierra Resort, Tors had keyed machines at the (a)
Eldorado Hotel and Casino, Reno, Nevada; (b) Circus Circus Hotel/Casino, Reno,
Reno Nevada; (c) Siena Hotel Spa Casino, Reno, Nevada; (d) Tamarack Junction,
Reno, Nevada; (e) Wendover Nugget Hotel & Casino, Wendover, Nevada; (f) Red
Garter Hotel & Casino, Wendover, Nevada; (g) Atlantis Casino Resort, Reno,
Nevada; (h) Hobey’s Casino, Sun Valley, Nevada; (i) Rail City Casino, Sparks,
Nevada; and (j) Baldini’s Sports Casino, Sparks, Nevada. See Complaint, supra
note 2, at 6.
28
Id.
29
Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15, at 2; Howard Stutz, Inside
Gaming: Fattest Fines Have Come in a Flurry, L.V. REV.- J. (Mar. 23, 2014, 8:12
AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/business-columns/inside-gaming/
inside-gaming-fattest-fines-have-come-in-a-flurry/.
30
See Bill O’Driscoll, Nevada Regulators: Slot Reset Keys Give Limited Access,
27
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Eventually, the Peppermill’s breaches led to civil actions as well. The
Grand Sierra Resort filed a civil suit seeking damages against the Peppermill.31
The Grand Sierra Resort alleged, among other things, that the information
stolen amounted to a trade secret that the Peppermill had misappropriated. The
ensuing litigation raised novel issues never before examined by any court —
namely, whether the PAR settings maintained by a company could be held as a
trade secret.
II. TRADE SECRETS GENERALLY
Protecting trade secrets is not a novel concept. Scholars have traced the
concept of a “trade secret” back to the ancient Roman practice known as actio
servi corrupti, interpreted as an “action for making a slave worse.”32
Essentially, this idea meant that a “Roman owner of a mark or firm name was
legally protected against unfair usage by a competitor. . .”33 Essentially, “actio
servi corrupti [allowed authorities] to grant commercial relief under the guise
of private legal actions.”34 A more recognizable form of trade secret law
emerged in 1817 with the English case Newbery v. James.35 This case involved
the unsuccessful attempt to prevent the disclosure of a secret invention.36
Despite being unsuccessful, this case marks the first time an issue was
discussed in a way that would foreshadow future trade secret cases.37 Vickery v.
Welch marks the first American consideration of a trade secret case, where the
Massachusetts’s Supreme Court considered the sale of a secret chocolate
making method.38
Trade secret law continued to grow on both sides of the Atlantic until
finally making an appearance in the Restatement (First) of Torts published by
the American Law Institute in 1939.39 In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court cleared
the way for states to develop their own trade secret protections.40 Shortly
thereafter, states began to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. To date, forty-

RENO GAZETTE J. (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.rgj.com/story/money/gaming/2014/
02/21/nevada-regulators-slot-reset-keys-give-limited-access/5702819/.
31
See Order, MEI-GSR Holdings LLC v. Peppermill Casinos Inc., CVlS-01704
(S.J.D.C.Nev., Aug. 27, 2014).
32
A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See Newbery v. James, 2 Mer. 446, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011, 1013 (Ch. 1817).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 523 (1 Pick. 1837).
39
See Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (Am. Law Inst. 1939) (stating that “one
who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, with or without a privilege to do so, is
liable to the other” if certain conditions are satisfied).
40
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 470 (1974).
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nine states have done so, along with Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.41 At the federal level, the Economic Espionage Act of
1996 made it a federal crime to misappropriate trade secrets for the benefit of a
foreign government.42 Most recently, the federal government passed the Defend
Trade Secrets Act which, for the first time, provided owners of trade secrets
with a private civil right of action at the federal level.43
A. Approaching Trade Secrets Today
Nonetheless, trade secrets law is not easily understood. In fact, legal
scholars cannot agree among themselves what trade secret law actually is.44
Traditionally, trade secret law stems in part from intellectual property theory
and part from tort theory.45 On one hand, trade secrets convey property rights to
the holder of the trade secret as a patent or trademark would.46 On the other,
they seek the “deterrence of wrongful acts . . . [and] to punish and prevent illicit
behavior, and even to uphold reasonable standards of commercial behavior,”
which makes them more punitive in nature, similar to an action in tort.47
Likewise, trade secrets have been alternatively described as a collateral
issue of contract law, a question of property law, and even a question of
“commercial morality,” based in the inherent equitable powers of a court.48
Other legal theorists reject these approaches altogether and call trade secret law
a “collection of other legal norms . . . united only by the fact that they are used
to protect secret information.”49 These scholars view trade secret law as nothing
more than an attempt to provide a remedy for conduct that “feels” wrong.
Each of these approaches has its strengths and its weaknesses and trade
secret law integrates aspects of all of them. With time however, the intellectual
property theory of trade secrets has taken over as the prevailing justification for
this area of law, although elements of torts and contract law persist.50 This
unique character has required both judicial and legislative adjustments to make
Legislative Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%2
0Act (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
42
18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012).
43
Id, § 1836.
44
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights,
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312-13 (2008).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 319.
48
See id. at 329.
49
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998).
50
See Lemley supra note 44, at 363 (“While the theoretical justifications for trade
secret law historically have been more varied and controversial than for patent or
copyright, courts and scholars increasingly theorize trade secret law as a subset of
intellectual property because it encourages information production.”)
41
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the theory practicable. “Secrecy” and “independent economic value” have
become substitutes for other factors commonly evaluated in intellectual
property cases such as ownership, authorship, or originality.51 These
adjustments form the basis of any trade secret analysis and are codified in the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act as adopted by most states. Under the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, a “trade secret” is defined as:
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.52
The elements contained in this definition are at the center of trade secret
litigation. Therefore, this article will analyze them in turn against the nature of
PAR information and the facts of the Peppermill case.
III. WHAT ARE TRADE SECRETS?
Unlike patents, trademarks, or copyrights, trade secrets do not have the
benefit of clearly defined subject matter or judicial frameworks. This has led to
a variety of outcomes and a relative uncertainty behind each trade secret action.
These outcomes often directly contradict each other as the same potential trade
secret is tried in different courts and results in different outcomes. For instance,
some courts have held that Scientology’s religious texts are trade secrets on the
grounds that they have licensing value.53 While other courts have held that
these same texts cannot be trade secrets as they are religious and not
commercial in nature.54 Likewise, restaurant recipes have been considered trade
secrets in some courts and denied protection in others.55 Sometimes rulings turn
on semantics as the same concept under different names finds different results
in different courts.56 Other times there is no identifiable rationale behind the
See id. at 244–46.
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (1985).
53
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 1986).
55
See Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 72 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
buffet’s recipes were not trade secrets); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F.
Supp. 1405, 1429 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that a bagel recipe was a trade secret).
56
Compare Astro Tech., Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., Civ. No. AH-03-0745,
2005 WL 6061803 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that a “generalized” plan for reaching
a “general” goal was not a trade secret), with Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas,
118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that a “business philosophy”
51
52
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decisions. For instance, nearly every type of financial record a business can
produce has been designated as both a trade secret and not a trade secret.57
Facing this confusion, scholars have attempted to establish a baseline
understanding of what a trade secret is. Some may look at the factual
circumstances and identify certain situations as more likely to give rise to trade
secrets, such as competitive intelligence, certain business transactions, and
departing employees.58 Others look for characteristics of the trade secret itself
to establish a framework that could be used to identify other trade secrets.
These traits include whether the secret is worth clawing back after release,
discreteness of the secret, or spoilability, among others.59 Despite how
unsettled this area of law is among scholars, as a practical matter, the courts
and legislators have reduced trade secrets to a two-factor test.60 First, is the
information secret? Secrecy is “indispensable to an effective allegation of a
trade secret,” is a question of fact, and must be claimed and maintained by the
party claiming a trade secret. 61 Second, the holder must “derive independent
economic value, actual or potential, from [the information] not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means.”62
Applying this mess of authority to the chaos of a casino is not easy. There
are only a few cases that have attempted to do this, and they have focused on
issues only tangentially related to gaming such as casino player information.63
Moreover, the analysis performed in these cases has been less focused on the
trade secret analysis itself and more focused on collateral issues such as noncompete clauses, and are therefore of little value to this analysis. Rather, this
article will be an organic review of the events that occurred in Reno and
applicable case law out of multiple jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform
Trade Secret Act or similar legislation.
IV. SECRECY: THE FOUNDATION OF TRADE SECRETS
What occurred in Reno at the Grand Sierra Resort is an interesting case
study in secrecy and efforts to maintain it for the purposes of trade secret law.
Like many trade secrets, PARs are inherently secret. Unless explained to them,

was protectable as a trade secret).
57
See, e.g. Prairie Island v. Minn. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 658 N.W.2d 876, 890
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that consolidated balance sheets, cash-flow
statements, and profit-and-loss statements were not trade secrets); RKI, Inc. v.
Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that financial
information in a company’s database is a trade secret).
58
Lemley, supra note 44, at 318.
59
Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 560-61
(2010).
60
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (1985).
61
1-1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.03 (2015).
62
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii).
63
See Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 161 (Nev. 2016).
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the average player would not even know that they existed and were shaping the
course of their evening spent gambling.64 However, their secrecy can be
pierced by an individual with the right knowledge and skills. Armed with the
proper mathematical formulas and data, PARs can be accurately reversed
engineered.65 This dismantling of a secret is often put forth as a defense to trade
secret cases. After all, if a trade secret is easily determined by competitors, can
it really be considered a secret?
There is no dispute that PARs can be reversed engineered by someone who
has the knowledge to do so and access to a slot floor’s data.66 Without access to
floor data, experts in slot operation can utilize complicated formulas for
determining what a casino’s PARS are. All of these techniques require
extensive slot play and complex mathematical formulas to evaluate the data
collected while playing. Five of these schemes — the request, ratio analysis,
ratio elimination, blind bin analysis, and minimal bin analysis — require in
depth knowledge of a casino’s player loyalty programs.67 Other methods,
termed video deconstruction or fingerprinting of real trip elimination, require
employees to secretly and repeatedly photograph the slot machine while it is
being played.68 The question is whether or not being reverse engineer-able
through these means defeats trade secret protection.
Multiple courts have evaluated the ease of a reverse engineering defense.
In AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the Eighth Circuit held
that revised helicopter overhaul specifications were trade secrets under the
Uniform Trade Secret Act.69 Rolls-Royce developed and produced engines
used in both civilian and military helicopters.70 A subsidiary of Rolls-Royce
was tasked with developing modifications to these engines and issued
proprietary instructions for doing so.71 These instructions were used by
AvidAir without authorization and became the subject of this suit.72 Even
though the revisions were “relatively minor” updates from publicly available
information, and the defendant could have easily received “FAA approval for a
procedure that [was] based on only publicly available information . . . [the
defendant’s] repeated attempts to secure the revised [overhaul information]
without [the plaintiff’s] approval belie[d] its claim that the information in the

See supra Part I.
See generally Ashley, supra note 6.
66
See id.
67
These methods are largely proprietary themselves and developed and employed
by various experts in the field.
68
Id.
69
AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 969 (8th
Cir. 2011).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 969–70.
72
Id. at 970.
64
65
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documents” was easily reverse engineered and not secret.73 The court reasoned
“[e]ven if information potentially could have been duplicated by other proper
means, it is no defense to claim that one’s product could have been developed
independently of plaintiff’s, if in fact it was developed by using plaintiff’s
proprietary designs.”74
Likewise, in K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., the
Texas Supreme Court held that a magnetic fishing tool was a trade secret.75 In
doing so, the court found that the tool could be easily duplicated “by an
examination of the tool without disassembling it,” and wasn’t obviously secret
at all.76 However, the court reasoned that because defendant “did not learn how
to make the [plaintiff’s] tool or a device similar thereto by observing it in an
assembled or unbroken condition, but learned of its internal proportions,
qualities, and mechanisms, by taking it apart despite an agreement that it would
not do so” they could not later argue it was not a trade secret.77 The court
further held that when “a trade secret is of such a nature that it can be
discovered by experimentation or other fair and lawful means does not deprive
its owner of the right to protection. . .”78 In other words, even if a trade secret
can easily be determined through lawful means such as reverse engineering, it
can still be considered secret.
Other courts have held that for this defense to work, the trade secret must
be ascertained “quickly” or be so “self-revealing” to be ascertainable “at a
glance.”79 This line of thinking has lead courts to require speed and efficiency
to reverse engineering for the defense to be persuasive.80 Courts generally look
Id. at 973–75.
Id. at 973.
75
See K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782,
793 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1958).
76
Id. at 786-87.
77
See id. at 787.
78
See id. at 788.
79
See Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., No. 08 C 5427, 2012 WL 74319, at *19
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that trade secret protection is applicable assuming
the secret does “not involve self-revealing information that any user or passer-by
sees at a glance”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993)
(specifying that the protected information need not “be unascertainable at all by
proper means, but only that they not be readily or quickly ascertainable by such
means”); Nat’l Instrument Labs., Inc. v. Hycel, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1179, 1181–82
(D. Del. 1979) (stating that secrets that are “ascertainable at a glance” will lose
protections); see also Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374-75 (7th Cir. 1953)
(holding that cargo container, available on the open market and accessible to
defendant for inspection, was a protectable trade secret because there was no
evidence that the “construction of which was ascertainable at a glance”).
80
See CheckPoint Fluidic Sys. Int’l, Ltd. v. Guccione, 888 F. Supp. 2d 780, 797
(E.D. La. 2012) (holding even though “pumps can be reverse engineered does not
bar a trade secret claim, as long as the pumps cannot be reverse engineered so
quickly as to be ‘readily ascertainable’”); Rycoline Products, Inc. v. Walsh, 756
A.2d 1047, 1055 (N. J. App. Div. 2000) (stating that to be readily ascertainable,
73
74
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at the average knowledge and capabilities of the industry to determine the
required speed and efficiency of reverse engineering. 81
Here, reverse engineerability should not defeat secrecy when discussing
PARs. Even if they could be reverse engineered, this fact alone is not enough to
prevent trade secret protection. They must also be quickly and easily reverse
engineered “at a glance.”82 Requiring experts and complicated formulas to
mount a defense undermines the ability to argue that reverse engineering is
easy or quick. The helicopter designs in Rolls Royce were clear to anyone in the
industry and easily recreated. Likewise, the magnetic fishing tool in K & G Oil
was a simple product by any standard. Both trade secrets where simpler and
easier to reverse engineer then PARs and yet both were still considered trade
secrets.
There is no case law that allows a defendant to claim that the complicated
observation and mathematical formulas necessary to determine the PARs of a
casino can justify reverse engineering as a defense. Even if there was, the fact
that the PARs in a single machine and across the casino floor are so quickly
and easily changed makes it even harder to show that they could be easily
reverse engineered. By the time an agent had observed a machine long enough
and collected enough data to determine the PARs, the settings could easily be
changed once again. This variability is a serious obstacle to reverse engineering
and explains why a party seeking this information would have to steal it.
Finally, it is important to note even the best formula deployed by the most
capable expert can only approximate the PARs across the casino floor. They
may be able to get very close, but they cannot determine PARs with exactness.
There are too many machines on the floor and too many possible variables for
this calculation to work. This lack of definiteness further undermines the claim
that the PARs aren’t secret and easily reversed engineered. In short, reverse
engineering is only a defense if it can be done quickly, easily, and accurately.
PARs are sufficiently difficult to reverse engineer and so easily varied that they
cannot likely be reverse engineered quickly, easily, and accurately. However,
even if the Peppermill could not successfully claim reverse engineering as a
defense, this is not the end of the secrecy analysis.
A. The Secrecy Analysis Beyond Reverse Engineering
Declaring something “secret” has its reasonable limits when determining
whether or not it can effectively be reverse engineered. An aggrieved business
owner can’t simply declare information as secret once they allow it to become
defendant must demonstrate that the information can be ascertained quickly).
81
See Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Serv-Tech, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 89, 111
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that to be a protected trade secret, “the trade secret
must not be generally known to or used by the industry or a matter completely
disclosed or ascertainable at a glance”).
82
See e.g. Motorola, Inc., No. 08 C 5427, 2012 WL 74319, at *19.
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widely known and then attempt to file suit. In other words, one cannot “clawback” trade secrets once they are made public.83 To embody this principle, the
secrecy requirement of trade secrets often morphs into an analysis of a party’s
reasonable efforts to keep the information secret. In E.I. duPont deNemours &
Co. v. Christopher, the defendants were photographers hired by an unknown
third party to take aerial photographs of new construction at the Plaintiff’s
industrial plant.84 The Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment
arguing that they were in public airspace and that the plant’s design was not
kept secret.85 The Fifth Circuit held that fencing and maintaining security at the
site were sufficient efforts to maintain secrecy and upheld the district court’s
denial of summary judgment.86
Likewise, other courts have approved of pedestrian measures undertaken
by the plaintiffs to protect their trade secrets. In Matter of Innovative Const.
Sys., Inc., the court held that even though plaintiff “did not employ security
personnel, and the plant was not locked during working hours” formulas were
considered reasonably protected trade secrets because they “were kept in a
notebook in the plant manager’s office, and hence out of view.”87 A similar
holding was reached in Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., which
also dealt with an unguarded plant and employees that were not instructed as to
secrecy.88 The court held that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to protect its
trade secret, since “plaintiffs took some steps to keep its operations
confidential” even though “these measures admittedly were not stringent
enough to withstand a deliberate spying attempt.”89
Other courts have applied a similar test and found the efforts taken to
maintain secrecy insufficient.90 Looking at the entirety of the situation
surrounding claimed trade secrets, the Minnesota Supreme Court in ElectroCraft Corp v. Controlled Motion, Inc. found that “fatally lax” security measures
were insufficient to sustain a trade secret claim.91 These failings included a
failure to mark technical documents, drawings, and diagrams as “confidential”
when they were distributed to customers and vendors, unrestricted employee
access to confidential documents, and a failure to properly train staff on

See generally Johnson, supra note 59.
See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1013
(5th Cir. 1970).
85
See id. at 1014.
86
See id. at 1015–16.
87
See Matter of Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 884-85 (7th Cir.
1986).
88
See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1979).
89
Id.
90
See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 902-03
(Minn. 1983).
91
See id. at 902.
83
84
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document secrecy.92 Informal tours of the facilities where products were being
made and plans were stored also contributed to an environment incapable of
producing trade secrets.93
Casinos have protections in place to keep their PARs secret. First, PARs
are only accessible by a physical key.94 More importantly, casinos are required
to follow extensive minimal control standards to protect the integrity of their
machines.95 These measures include quarterly inventories of all “2341” keys
and other instruments that provide any access to this data as well as
investigations of any keys that are unaccounted for.96 However, it should be
noted that despite the security in casinos, the “2341” keys in question are
readily available. At the time of this writing, used “2341” keys were available
for purchase by anyone online.97 Since the incident in Reno, Nevada gaming
regulators have required increased security measures surrounding reset keys at
all properties in the state.98 This state action along with the wide availability of
the keys undercuts the contention that the keys were useful to secure the
secrecy of trade secrets. Likewise, the other security measures in place have
nothing to do with trade secrets, but were designed to prevent cheating,
stealing, and other conventional crimes on the casino floor.99

See id.at 903.
See id.
94
See Bill O’Driscoll, Nevada Regulators: Slot Reset Keys Give Limited Access,
L.V. REV.-J. (Feb. 22, 2014), https://www.rgj.com/story/money/gaming/2014/02/
21/nevada-regulators-slot-reset-keys-give-limited-access/5702819/
95
See NEV. GAMING CONTROL BD., VERSION 8, MINIMUM INTERNAL STANDARDS:
GROUP 1 LICENSEES, http://gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx?page=182 (last visited Mar.
27, 2018).
96
See id. Such measures are explicitly defined within the Nevada Gaming Control
Board’s minimum internal standards as follows:
205. Quarterly, an inventory of all slot machine door keys,
reset keys, 2341 keys, attendant keys, any other similar slot
key or device, slot fill cabinet keys, count room, drop box
release, storage rack and contents keys is performed, and
reconciled to records of keys made, issued, and destroyed.
Investigations are performed for all keys unaccounted for,
with the investigation being documented.
97
See Howard Stutz, Slot Machine Keys Sold Online but Are They Useful?, WASH.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/14/slotmachine-keys-sold-online-but-are-they-useful/; see also EBAY, http://www.ebay
.com/itm/Attendant-reset-keys-2341
/121746934761?hash=item1c58aecbe9:g:H0UAAOSwHnFVu6z- (last visited Mar.
27, 2018) (showing an example of “2341” keys available for purchase online).
98
See Stutz, supra note 97.
99
These measures include security cameras, on floor personal, and other visible
means employed by the casino to watch patrons suspected of cheating. Likewise,
dealers and other employees follow strict procedures when beginning and ending
their shifts to maintain the integrity of each casino game. See NEV. GAMING
CONTROL BD., SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS FOR NON-RESTRICTED LICENSEES,
http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=2944 (last visited
92
93
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Attacking the security measures in place is common and may make logical
sense, but doing so is undermined by the established case law. The court in
DuPont held that a party claiming trade secret protections did not have to take
extreme and unorthodox measures to protect their trade secrets.100 Requiring a
casino to put extra protections in place for their trade secrets would be akin to
requiring the plaintiff in DuPont to put a massive roof over their factory. It
would not be practical or fair to require such lengths to protect their trade
secrets.
Courts have codified this principle into common law. The court in ElectroCraft found security measures lacking, as the basic requirements common in
the industry were not being followed.101 Failure to implement these industry
norms rendered the plaintiff’s precautions “fatally lax.”102 In the casino, the
theft of PAR information is unprecedented. As such, established security
measures were not prepared to handle it.103 However, the measures in place, as
a whole, were in no means “fatally lax.” This is evidenced by the fact that
hundreds of slot cheats are captured each year as they attempt to tamper with
machines.104 As you will recall from the Peppermill case, Mr. Tors was
captured as he attempted to misappropriate trade secrets from his
competitors.105 However, even if the Grand Sierra Resort’s security measures
hadn’t been effective, the court in Hickory made it clear that security measures
need not withstand “a deliberate spying attempt.”106 By evaluating these facts
and the relevant case law, it is clear that casino security systems are more than
sufficient to maintain the secrecy of PAR information.
Finally, it is possible to inadvertently publish your trade secret and lose any
protection you may have been entitled to.107 When dealing with PAR
information, this mistaken disclosure would likely look like a marketing
campaign or other public statement by the casino. A casino may advertise that
Mar. 27, 2018).
100
See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 101617 (5th Cir. 1970).
101
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 890 (Minn.
1983).
102
Id. at 902.
103
Id.
104
For example, the Nevada Gaming Control Board had 574 arbitration cases in
2015, disputing $51.8 million, and made 602 criminal arrests of attempted cheats.
Further, between 250 to 500 casino employees are arrested by the Gaming Control
Board each year. See Nicole Raz, Basic Casino Cheating Scams Hardest to Catch,
L.V. REV.-J. (Sep. 26, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/
casinos-gaming/basic-casino-cheating-scams-hardest-to-catch-gaming-experts-say/.
105
Complaint, supra note 2, at 5-6.
106
Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1979).
107
AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 975 (8th
Cir. 2011); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., 381 F.3d 811,
819 (8th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1972).
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they have the loosest casino in town. They may advertise that a popular game
found at every casino pays out the most at their property. For example, the
“Buffalo” is a nickel slot machine that is among the most popular games on any
casino floor.108 Promoting the loosest Buffalo machines in town would be a
good way to win over local, frequent gamblers who play only this specific
machine. As these machines are so common, the PAR settings for them would
likely be widely known to the other operators in town. So, by advertising the
loosest PAR settings in town, a casino would essentially be publishing their
exact PARs on this game to all of their competitors and they would no longer
be secret.
Even if the Grand Sierra Resort had published their PAR information in
this way, many trade secrets cases deal with expressly public information,
which is not a bar to trade secret protection. In Avidair, the information had
been made expressly public through the Federal Aviation Administration and it
was still found to be a trade secret.109 Likewise, in Conseco Fin. Servicing
Corp. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., the court evaluated whether marketing “lead
sheets” could be considered trade secrets.110 These sheets were “accessible to
the public,” but were still deemed trade secrets because the information they
contained could not “be obtained from alternative sources.”111 In Clark v.
Bunker, information in a plan for marketing prepaid funeral services was still
considered a trade secret despite being contained in brochures distributed to the
public.112 In short, the secrecy required for trade secret protection is not total or
complete secrecy, and may not be automatically defeated simply because some
PARs are potentially ascertainable from public advertisements.
As the preeminent element behind trade secret cases, secrecy is
complicated but vital. The very nature of PARs and slot machine data speaks to
their being secret. Likewise, PARs are not sufficiently public or obvious to be
reversed engineered without considerable effort. Finally, casinos generally have
substantial security measures in place to protect their operations and by
extension their PAR data. Taking all of these factors together, theoretical hold
percentages in a casino generally meet the secrecy requirements to gain trade
secret protection. As in many trade secret cases, this secrecy surrounding PARs
is tied directly into the misappropriation that occurs on a case by case basis.

See Aristocrat Performs Strongly in Latest Eilers-Fantini Quarterly Slot Survey,
MARKET WIREd (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/
aristocrat-performs-strongly-in-latest-eilers-fantini-quarterly-slot-survey2092977.htm.
109
AvidAir, 663 F.3d at 975.
110
Conseco, 381 F.3d at 819.
111
Id.
112
Clark, 453 F.2d at 1010.
108
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V. MISAPPROPRIATION AND USE OF PARS AS TRADE SECRETS
Nevada and other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret
Act provide three alternative definitions for “misappropriation.”113 The Nevada
Uniform Trade Secret Act defines “misappropriation” as:
(a) Acquisition of the trade secret of another by a person
by improper means;
(b) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret
was acquired by improper means; or
(c) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
express or implied consent by a person who:
(1) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of
the trade secret;114
Each one of these definitions requires that the trade secret be gained through
improper means. “Improper means” is defined as:
(a) Theft; (b) Bribery; (c) Misrepresentation; (d) Willful
breach or willful inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy; (e) Willful breach or willful
inducement of a breach of a duty imposed by common
law, statute, contract, license, protective order or other
court or administrative order; and (f) Espionage through
electronic or other means.115
Likewise, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt. f,
states: “When a defendant has engaged in egregious misconduct in order to
acquire the information, the inference that the information is sufficiently
inaccessible to qualify for protection as a trade secret is particularly strong.”116
Finally, the United States Supreme Court held that trade secret law “does not
offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means,” however, it does
protect “the holder of a trade secret against disclosure or use when the
knowledge is gained, not by the owner’s volition, but by some ‘improper
means.’”117
Misappropriation is a vital part of any trade secret claim. In Saturn Sys.,
Inc. v. Militare, the court held that under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, a claim
for misappropriation requires proof of “acquisition of a trade secret of another
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means” such as theft.118 DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp.,

113
114
115
116
117
118

NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010, 030(2) (2016).
Id. § 600A.030(2).
Id. § 600A.030(1).
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt. f. (Am. Law. Inst. 1995).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1974).
Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d 516, 525 (Colo. App. 2011).
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also held that to “establish a trade secret misappropriation claim” under the
Uniform Trade Secret Act, a plaintiff must “demonstrate (1) the existence of a
trade secret; and (2) acquisition of the trade secret by improper means, or
improper use or disclosure by one under a duty not to disclose”119 Multiple
other courts who have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act have reached
similar conclusions.120
The confluence of misappropriation and secrecy is illustrated in Reingold
v. Swiftships, Inc.121 The Fifth Circuit held that a boat hull mold was entitled to
protection as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secret Act.122 This ruling
was based on the mold still being a secret even though defendant “could have
reverse engineered a mold from an existing hull,” because the defendant did not
create the infringing mold from an existing hull, but instead “misappropriated
the trade secret” by improper means.123 The parties to this action had entered
into a contract that required payment each time the mold was used and
notification of any adjustments made to the mold.124 Swiftships began to use
the mold to construct an order of hulls for an international client without paying
or notifying Reingold.125 This breach of contract was held to be “improper
means” of appropriating the trade secret.126 The fact that the hull design could
have been used legally if the terms of the contract were followed was
immaterial.127 The court stated that “protection will be accorded to a trade
secret holder against disclosure or unauthorized use gained by improper means,

DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77 (D.D.C. 2007).
See, e.g. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 589 (Del. Ch. 2010) aff’d
sub nom. ASDI, Inc. v. Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010) (holding,
under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, to “maintain a successful claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must show both the existence of a
trade secret and its misappropriation” “through the acquisition of a trade secret of
another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means”); BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d
677, 683 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sip-Top, Inc. v. Ekco Group, Inc., 86 F.3d 827,
833 (8th Cir. 1996)) (holding that misappropriation of a trade secret is established
by “(1) improper acquisition of a trade secret” such as by theft; “or (2) disclosure or
use of a trade secret without consent”); DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp.,
245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding under the Uniform Trade Secret Act
that a “misappropriation occurs when one acquires the secret information ‘by
improper means’ or discloses the secret information acquired by ‘improper
means’”); Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346,
350 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding Virginia’s Uniform Trade Secret Act “prohibits the
improper acquisition of a trade secret, whether or not the secret is used”).
121
Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 650-52 (5th Cir. 1997).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 651–52.
124
Id. at 650.
125
Id. at 650–51.
126
Id. at 650.
127
Id. at 651.
119
120
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even if others might have discovered the trade secret by legitimate means.”128
This holding is not unique. “The fact that a trade secret . . . can be
discovered by experimentation or other fair and lawful means does not deprive
its owner of the right to protection from those who would secure possession of
it by unfair means.”129 Likewise, stealing a trade secret is “evidence [that]
supports a finding that [the trade secret] was not readily ascertainable” and
therefore “deserves protection as a trade secret.”130
It is important to note that to be considered misappropriation, the action
does not necessarily have to be illegal. Returning to E.I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co. v. Christopher, the Fifth Circuit held that “aerial photography of plant
construction [to determine another’s secret manufacturing process] is an
improper means of obtaining another’s trade secret.”131 The Fifth Circuit
reached this holding even though the defendant “violated no government
aviation standard, did not breach any confidential relation, and did not engage
in any fraudulent or illegal conduct.”132 The court did find however, that this
conduct fell well “below the generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct.”133 This ruling was based on the premise that
the court would not “require a person or corporation to take unreasonable
precautions to prevent another from doing that which he ought not to do in the
first place.”134 Put a different way, “thou shall not appropriate a trade secret
through deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing defenses are
not reasonably available.”135
Examining what happened in Reno, there is little doubt that the PARs in
question where misappropriated through improper means. Upon investigation
by Gaming Control officials, it became immediately clear that the Peppermill
was conducting a systematic and purposeful effort to steal information from
their competitors.136 As a result of these findings, the Peppermill was fined one
million dollars by the Control Board which represented one of the largest fines
ever assessed in Nevada up to this point.137 The more interesting question that
came out of Reno is not whether the PARs had been misappropriated, but if use
of the PARs is required for them to be misappropriated. If the Peppermill could

Id. at 652.
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953).
130
DPT Labs., Ltd. v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., No. CIV.SA-98-CA-664-JWP,
1999 WL 33289709, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1999).
131
E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1970).
132
Id. at 1014.
133
Id. at 1016.
134
Id. at 1017.
135
Id.
136
Complaint, supra note 2, at 6.
137
See Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15, at 2; see also Stutz,
supra note 29.
128
129

JOHNSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2018]

4/2/2018 1:11 PM

TRADE SECRET PROTECTIONS ON THE CASINO FLOOR

139

show that what happened in Reno was simply the obsession of an over-eager
employee that management was foolish enough to indulge, could it still be
misappropriation?
A. Equating Use and Misappropriation
Defendants often attempt to substitute a “use” analysis for
misappropriation. They reason that if information is not used, then the
misappropriation did not occur. While this may seem logical, this approach is
not supported by established case law. In Binary Semantics Ltd. v. Minitab,
Inc., logic demanded that the court find that a “theft of trade secrets necessarily
implies that they will be used.”138 Likewise, in RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, the court
held that, in several situations, use of trade secrets gained during the course of
employment would be inevitable when an employee changed jobs.139 Whether
it was proven or not, the former employee and his new employer “unlawfully
misappropriated [his former employer’s] trade secret information because it is
inevitable [that the employee] will use the information he obtained.”140 The
court noted that “direct evidence of theft and use of trade secrets is often not
available,” and therefore “the plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence to
prove misappropriation.”141 Applying this standard, the court concluded, that
the former employer had “proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [the
former employee and his new employer had] misappropriated its trade
secrets.”142 The court also relied on circumstantial evidence in Uhlig LLC v.
Shirley.143 Even without presenting “much, if any, direct evidence of use of the
compilation trade secrets,” by proving that the employee took “confidential and
trade secret information,” the former employer provided “the jury with
substantial circumstantial evidence from which it could have determined that
[the employee] actually used the information.”144
In PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an
employee “pursuing and accepting his new job” with a direct competitor was
enough to conclude that the employee would “inevitably. . .rely on” his
knowledge to benefit his new employer.145 The court reached this conclusion

Binary Semantics Ltd. v. Minitab, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:07-CV-1750, 2008
WL 763575, at 4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2008).
139
RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
140
Id. at 875.
141
Id. at 876.
142
Id. at 877.
143
Uhlig LLC v. Shirley, Civil Action No. 6:08-CV-01208-JMC, 2012 WL
2923242, at 7 (D.S.C. July 17, 2012).
144
See id.; see also Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 351, 360 (Nev. 2000) (holding that
“circumstantial evidence” is “sufficient” to support finding that defendants
“misappropriated trade secrets”).
145
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995).
138
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without any proof that the competitor had even stolen any trade secrets.146 The
basis for this finding was practical in nature; the court held that “unless [the
employee] possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize information, he
would necessarily be making decisions . . . by relying on his knowledge of [his
former employer’s] trade secrets.”147
Other courts have taken a simpler approach. In Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare,
the Colorado Court of Appeals, interpreting Colorado’s Uniform Trade Secret
Act, held that no actual use of the stolen information was required.148 The
plaintiff showed that the defendant “knowingly acquired password-protected
information by improper means” even though defendant “did not utilize or print
any information.”149 This conclusion was important because the court held that
“it is irrelevant whether [the defendant] actually used [plaintiff’s] client and
debtor information to compete against [the plaintiff] because . . . there is no
requirement in [the Uniform Trade Secret Act] that there be actual use or
commercial implementation of the misappropriated trade secret for damages to
accrue.”150 Other courts which have reached the same conclusion, have found
that an entity willing to employ improper means to obtain information will
certainly use the information gained.151 While others have reached the same
conclusion based only upon the lack of a “use” requirement in the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.152 To date, no version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has
been adopted that has specifically required use.153
Even if use of the trade secret was required, the facts and circumstances
behind trade secret cases nearly always create the presumption of use
regardless of what the defendant may claim. For example, it is apparent from
the Nevada Gaming Control Board’s Complaint against the Peppermill that the
information Ryan Tors gathered was continuously and repeatedly shared with
the Peppermill’s top brass.154 This sharing of information with the executives
heavily implies that it was in fact at least reviewed by those persons.
Otherwise, there would be no reason for them to continuously accept the
information gathered.
Unlike in Uhlig and Minitab, where the competitor could argue that they

Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1269.
148
Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d at 525; Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 460 F.
Supp.2d 1177, 1184 (C.D.Cal. 2006).
149
Id. at 525.
150
Id.
151
Ajuba Int’l., L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F.Supp.2d 671, 691 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
152
Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Reynolds, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063
(E.D. Mo. 2005); Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp.
346, 350 (E.D. Va. 1995).
153
Nevada’s Uniform Trade Secret Act allows for evidence of use or distribution.
NEV. REV. STAT § 600A.030(2) (2016).
154
Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.
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147

JOHNSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2018]

4/2/2018 1:11 PM

TRADE SECRET PROTECTIONS ON THE CASINO FLOOR

141

knew nothing of the misappropriation, the management of the Peppermill
admitted directing and condoning Mr. Tors’ actions. In the Stipulation for
Settlement and Order between the Peppermill and the State Gaming Control
Board, the Peppermill admitted that between 2011 and July 12, 2013, the
Peppermill management “knew of, approved of, and directed Mr. Tors’s
conduct of obtaining theoretical hold percentage information from the slot
machines of other casinos using a ‘reset’ key.”155 There is also much more
circumstantial evidence than in either Uhlig or Minitab. Likewise, the conduct
in this case is far beyond the “lack of candor” the Seventh Circuit found
troubling in PepsiCo.156
The sheer number of times the data was stolen indicates that the Peppermill
had a program and a use for the data. Moreover, Mr. Tors admitted that he had
stolen PAR data from the Grand Sierra Resort and other properties on multiple
occasions over many years.157 If the data was taken out of mere curiosity and
never used, there was no reason for Mr. Tors to continuously steal it while
risking his livelihood each time. Furthermore, the nature of slot machine
gambling and the data itself points towards its use. Casinos often portray
themselves as the “loosest” in town. The data collected by Mr. Tors allowed the
Peppermill to do so without sacrificing any profits they did not need to. In
essence, knowing this information eliminated the guess work from operating a
slot floor. As the information stolen by Mr. Tors would allow the Peppermill to
operate more efficiently, it is arguably illogical to assume they did not use the
data to do so.
The PARs at issue here were clearly misappropriated through theft.158
Moreover, their use is not required to show misappropriation.159 Even if it was,
there exists ample direct and circumstantial evidence that the Peppermill was
interested in and had a use for this data.160
VI. INDEPENDENT VALUE OF PAR INFORMATION
Once secrecy has been established, the plaintiff must show that the
information has actual or potential independent economic value that flows from
it not being generally known.161 There have been dozens of theories put forth
by scholars as tests for “independent value,” one of the more common theories

See id.; see also Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15, at 1.
See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995).
157
Complaint, supra note 2, at 5–6.
158
Id.
159
Ajuba Int’l., L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F.Supp.2d 671, 691 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Reynolds, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063 (E.D.
Mo. 2005); Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346,
350 (E.D. Va. 1995).
160
See Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.
161
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
155
156
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is one of “positive value” to the secret holder.162 Some academics have gone as
far as to declare that “positive value” to the holder of the trade secret is the first
and most important characteristic of a trade secret.163 This way of thinking is
based on the assumption that positive value is what makes the difference
between a trade secret and any other secret. As an example, a recipe for a
popular soda has positive value to the corporation that produces the soda. Other
secrets, such as a history of tax evasion by key executives, have no positive
value. Both would be devastating if released to the public, but only one can be
considered a trade secret.
As the embodiment of their strategic plans and decisions, PARs arguably
have extraordinary positive value to the corporation. This importance would
stem less from what the numbers were at any given time and more from the
observable trends over time. These trends could be a kind of formula for
success that competitors could easily copy once they had stolen it. Conversely,
the Peppermill’s program of secretly gathering PAR information is a classic
example of a secret that has no positive value. The PAR information program
was devastating to the company when its existence became public because of
the punishment it brought to the Peppermill, not because the conduct was no
longer secret. This is the central difference between a secret that derives
positive value from being secret and the average secret.
Other scholars argue that the value behind a trade secret must be objective
and transferrable from one party to another. This means that a secret must have
potential value to any party that misappropriates it.164 For example, if one firm
develops a novel technique for manufacturing their product and another firm
could utilize this information to streamline their own production it has
objective transferrable value. Alternatively, some information only has
subjective value.165 This type of information is only useful to the party that
possesses it and it cannot be a trade secret.166 Examples include a company’s
human resource records. These records may be very valuable to a company and
its ongoing operations, but would not mean anything to a competitor. The value
cannot transfer directly to others. The aphorism “one man’s trash is another
man’s treasure,” perfectly describes subjective information.167 When dealing
with trade secrets, one man’s treasure must be another man’s treasure.168
One may argue that PARs are objective and transferrable because the
misappropriating party could make immediate use of it as soon as the

Johnson, supra note 59, at 567 (discussing that the “holder” of a trade secret
may be either the rightful owner of the trade secret or an alleged misappropriator).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 568.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
162
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information is in their possession. Conversely, one could also argue that PARs
are a textbook example of one man’s trash being another’s treasure. Even
within the casino industry, some parties may be completely uninterested in their
competitor’s PARs, while other parties, like the Peppermill, are willing to go to
great lengths to get them.
There are still other possible ways to approach the question of independent
value. Some argue that a trade secret must be emancipatable from the trade
secret holder.169 This is similar to transferability and means that the information
must stand on legs of its own apart from the creator.170 For example, a
manufacturing process that is more efficient and cost effective than what
currently exists would still have value if the company that created it went into
bankruptcy tomorrow. It could be sold or licensed by whoever obtained it from
the bankruptcy estate. Conversely, plans to roll out a new product might have
strategic value to competitors, but it would be worthless if the company was
forced to close and the product launch never happened.171 Spoilability is also
sometimes put forth as a measure of independent value.172 Simply put, if the
information is spoiled by disclosure, then it could be considered a trade secret.
The rationale behind this theory of independent value is directly tied to the
secrecy analysis above. The strongest trade secrets would be subject to both the
emancipatable and spoilability requirements.
Evaluated together, these tests weigh both for and against PARs as trade
secrets. On the one hand, PARs cannot be emancipated from the property
where they originate. If that property’s doors close tomorrow, the PARs would
be worthless. However, the PAR holder could counter by arguing that PARs are
incredibly spoilable. Neither party can effectively argue these factors together
and take advantage of the powerful one-two punch that they provide.
All of these theories work primarily in the pages of academic journals and
are not discussed frequently in the common law. This makes their application
difficult. Courts have however, employed a definition based approach to the
words “independent economic value.”173 “Economic Value” is not a difficult
term to define. A secret is worth what someone is willing to risk to obtain it. In
this case, the Peppermill was willing to risk a great deal to obtain PARs from
their competitors. They were willing to risk their gaming license and their
entire operation to gain this information, so it clearly must have economic
value to them.
On the other hand, the word “independent” is more interesting and less
studied. A few courts have summarily attached practical definitions to the word
“independent” to make its application easier including the following: the fact

169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 547.
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that someone would pay money to get the information;174 that the firm holding
the information stands to lose money if the information is disclosed;175 that the
information allows the firm having it to gain competitive advantage over firms
not having it;176 that the information’s economic value (to the holding firm)
comes from its secrecy;177 and that the information took a substantial amount of
time, effort, and/or money to develop.178
Some academics have argued that the word “independent” should mean
that the information has the same academic value to every firm in the industry
for the same reason and that this value exists independently of the
information’s creator.179 This definition is effectively the “emancipatability and
spoilability” combination test discussed above, and has not yet been applied by
any court. However, one court has ruled that there is no trade secret when
information is only useful to the plaintiff.180 While this is not exactly the same
as the “emancipatability and spoilability” test, it is in the same ball park.
As this area of trade secret law is so unsettled and the possible tests the
court could apply is so varied any determination of who should triumph
between the Peppermill and Grand Sierra Resort is pure speculation. It would
most likely depend not upon the state of the law, but upon the particular judge,
jury, or attorneys arguing the case on any given day. As such, this factor is less
important than the others and rarely addressed in detail by the courts.
VII. DAMAGES
Finally, the Plaintiff in any action for the misappropriation of trade secrets
must establish damages. There are multiple ways and means that damages are
evaluated and measured. The Uniform Trade Secret Act as adopted by Nevada
allows for “damages caused by misappropriation [to] be measured by
imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator’s

Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Pub. Co., No. 92 Civ. 3652 (JSM), 1993 WL
541219, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993) (holding that the willingness of companies
in the industry to pay for a license for the information was sufficient to raise an
inference of independent economic value).
175
See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1455 (Cal. App.
2002).
176
Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Int’l, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306,
1309-10 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that religious material qualifies as a trade secret if
it confers on its owner an economic advantage over competitors).
177
E.g. Dodson Int’l. Parts, Inc. v. Altendorf, 347 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1010 (D. Kan.
2004) (applying Kansas law); Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381
F.3d 811, 818-19 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Missouri law); Strategic Directions
Grp., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 293 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2002)
(applying Minnesota law).
178
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 848 (10th Cir.
1993).
179
Johnson, supra note 59, at 571.
180
Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 587 (Md. App. 1991).
174
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unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.”181 This approach has found
support in multiple courts and is a concept appropriated from patent law.182
In University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., the Fifth Circuit
Court explained that the “reasonable royalty standard” measures “the value of
the secret to the defendant” and not a more practical literal valuation that would
be applied in other types of actions.183 This case dealt with stolen computer
tapes that contained a retail management program called AIMES III.184 This
system was stolen by an employee, who attempted but failed to successfully to
find a buyer for it.185 Despite the fact that it was never sold, the court still held
that plaintiff was entitled to reasonable royalty for the program, even though
“no actual profits exist by which to value the worth to the defendants of what
they misappropriated.”186 The court continued that “the lack of actual profits
does not insulate the defendants from being obliged to pay for what they have
wrongfully obtained in the mistaken belief their theft would benefit them.”187
The court ultimately concluded “that the risk of defendants’ venture, using the
misappropriated secret, should not be placed on the injured plaintiff, but rather
the defendants must bear the risk of failure themselves.”188
Since the “reasonable royalty” approach has its roots in patent law, patent
cases are instructive when evaluating damages for misappropriating trade
secrets.189 In patent law, when determining “reasonable royalties” actual profit
earned after the infringement are only “among the factors to be considered in
determining a reasonable royalty.”190 Further, “the law does not require that an
NEV. REV. STAT § 600A.050(1) (2016).
See also Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir.
2014) (holding language in Uniform Trade Secret Act stating that “[i]n lieu of
damages measured by any other methods,” provides that reasonable royalty
damages are a “general option”); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners,
LLC, No. 08-0840-CV-W-ODS, 2012 WL 3047308, at 3 (W.D. Mo. July 25, 2012)
(ruling, under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, that plaintiff may elect to recover the
royalty value of its trade secrets in lieu of damages measured by both plaintiff’s
loss and defendant’s unjust enrichment).
183
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th
Cir. 1974).
184
Id. at 529.
185
Id. at 533-34.
186
Id. at 536, 540.
187
Id. at 536.
188
Id.
189
See Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 411 S.W.3d 581, 609 (Tex. App.
2013) (explaining the “use of a ‘reasonable royalty’ in the calculation of damages
in trade secret misappropriation cases was borrowed from patent infringement
cases”); Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 310 (Iowa 1998) (explaining
that “[g]iven the difficulty of assessing damages in trade secret cases, courts have
frequently analogized damages in a trade secret action to those measures of
damages usually employed in patent infringement cases” including damages based
on “reasonable royalties”).
190
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
181
182
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infringer be permitted to make a profit.”191 This would transform the royalty
into “a form of compulsory license,” granted “against the will and interest of
the person wronged, [and] in favor of the wrongdoer.”192
In Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a large
jury verdict for the misappropriation of trade secrets.193 This royalty award was
upheld despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not show that the Defendant made
commercial use of the trade secret.194 The court clarified that any requirement
that a party prove commercial use to obtain damages calculated under a
reasonable royalty theory were based on “the common law’s requirements . . .
well before the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”195 This is because
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as adopted in every state provides for
reasonable royalty damages for cases involving disclosure or use.196 This
approach makes logical sense because of the inherent complexity involved in
proving these damages when all of the evidence needed is in the hands of the
defendant.197 This fact alone “may be enough to explain why a state would
wish to make reasonable royalty awards generally available to misappropriation
plaintiffs” as “it is hardly unknown for the law to resolve ambiguities about the
appropriate quantity of damages against the proven wrongdoer rather than his
victim.”198
Other courts have employed a slightly different method to determine
reasonable royalties including “hypothetical negotiations between a willing
licensor and willing licensee.”199 The court in Fromson explained:
[the] methodology encompasses fantasy and flexibility;
fantasy because it requires a court to imagine what
warring parties would have agreed to as willing
negotiators; flexibility because it speaks of negotiations
as of the time infringement began, yet permits and often
requires a court to look to events and facts that occurred
thereafter and that could not have been known to or
predicted by the hypothesized negotiators.200
It is important to note that trade secret cases are often not a “willing
licensor/willing licensee’ negotiation . . . as the [plaintiff] does not wish to

Id.
Id.
193
Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183, 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2014).
194
Id. at 1183, 1186.
195
Id. at 1187.
196
Id. at 1186–88.
197
Id. at 1186.
198
Id. at 1186–87.
199
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH
v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
200
Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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grant a license.”201 For that reason, the Sixth Circuit held the “setting of a
reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the equivalent of
ordinary royalty negotiations among truly ‘willing’” parties because that “view
would constitute a pretense that the infringement never happened.”202 This
would also grant competitors the ability to effectively force a “compulsory
license” on their competition where “the infringer would have nothing to lose,
and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine
royalty non-infringers might have paid.”203 To prevent this from occurring, the
courts have wide latitude to determine what a proper royalty should be. Courts
often consider the “opinion testimony of qualified experts, the [plaintiff’s]
relationship with the infringer, and other factors that might warrant higher
damages.”204
This approach stems from the principle “that every case requires a flexible
and imaginative approach to the problem of damages.”205 The overarching
principle is that “[w]here the damages are uncertain, we do not feel that
uncertainty should preclude recovery; the plaintiff should be afforded every
opportunity to prove damages once the misappropriation is shown.”206 Courts
in other jurisdictions have also applied this same standard.207 Regardless of
whatever other methods are used to determine damages, general royalties
remains as a “general option” for the courts to pursue.208
PAR data presents an interesting testing ground for the “reasonable
royalty” theory of trade secret damages. On one hand, PARS have no obvious
commercial value and so any theory of damages based upon royalties would
seem unlikely to succeed. Experts could argue that PARs cannot be trade
secrets and so it is not possible to sustain damages for their misappropriation.
They could cite the fact that no one has ever released the PAR information of
their casino floor to a competitor for any kind of royalty. This approach makes
logical sense and would likely win the day in any other type of case. However,
it is inconsistent with the established case law of trade secrets. It overlooks the
fact that trade secret cases are inherently punitive in nature.
The aggrieved party should approach the “reasonable royalty” standard in a
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, n. 13 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir.
1978).
203
Id.
204
M. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
205
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 538 (5th
Cir. 1974).
206
Id.
207
See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, LLC, No. 08-0840-CVW-ODS, 2012 WL 3047308, at 3 (W.D. Mo. July 25, 2012) (ruling under the
Uniform Trade Secret Act, that plaintiff may elect to recover the royalty value of its
trade secrets in lieu of damages measured by both plaintiff’s loss and defendant’s
unjust enrichment).
208
Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183, 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2014).
201
202

JOHNSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

148

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

4/2/2018 1:11 PM

[Vol. 8:121

way that is more analogous with trade secret case law. As in Storage Craft,
where the plaintiff was not required to show evidence of commercial use, it
would be impractical to require the plaintiff in a trade secrets action to establish
damages when all the evidence required to do so is held by the other side. This
problem is addressed by the court’s reasoning in University Computing Co., the
court pointed out that the “reasonable royalty standard” meant the value of the
trade secret to the defendant and not the plaintiff, effectively side stepping the
issue entirely.209 Approaching the issue of damages from this direction allows
the PAR holder to articulate the subjective worth of the information and does
not require them to prove actual damages. Any other approach would allow a
bad actor to hide behind the inherent difficulty of determining the financial
value of information such as PARs.
Courts have also evaluated the value of trade secrets and damages based
upon what a party is willing to risk to obtain the trade secret. In AvidAir
Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the Eighth Circuit Court
identified “repeated attempts” to secure plaintiff’s trade secrets by improper or
“reprehensible means” and held that they demonstrated the value of the trade
secret to the infringing party.210 This was one of the key factors that allowed
the court to uphold the jury’s verdict for $350,000 in actual damages as
reasonable.211 Other courts have also recently applied this same standard.212
The Peppermill’s actions show the value of the PAR information and the
damages they should face. The Peppermill’s system of electronic espionage
could have cost the company its gaming license and devastated its reputation
throughout the state of Nevada. The Peppermill potentially faced multiple
lawsuits — and possibly even criminal charges — at both the state and federal
level. It is fair to say that no reasonable person, let alone corporation, would
risk these consequences unless they stood to gain something of substantial
value. Based upon this inherent value, a party could easily argue that it is
entitled to damages for the misappropriation of its PARs.
Other courts have applied other flexible and imaginative approaches to
determining damages. For instance, in Mid-Michigan Computer Sys., Inc. v.
Marc Glassman, Inc., software used to maintain prescription and billing
records for customers was licensed for use between the parties.213 Part of this

University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th
Cir. 1974).
210
AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 973-74
(8th Cir. 2011).
211
Id. at 971, 977.
212
See W. Plains, L.L.C. v. Retzlaff Grain Co. Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784–85
(D. Neb. 2013) (holding the improper methods “used by the Individual Defendants
to take Confidential Information from [plaintiff] suggest that the information was
valuable”).
213
Mid-Michigan Computer Sys., Inc. v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 416 F.3d 505, 507
(6th Cir. 2005).
209
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agreement included a “Source Code Agreement” that made the code behind the
program accessible in emergency situations.214 Glassman, Inc. used this
agreement to access the code, copy it, and create new software to replace what
they had previously licensed.215 When Mid-Michigan prevailed in court on
their trade secret claims, they were granted damages based upon a liquidated
damages clause in the contract.216 The defendant argued that because the source
code agreement wasn’t breached, it was not an accurate measure of damages.
The Sixth Circuit held that even though this agreement was not breached, it still
provided “a benchmark for estimating what the parties would have agreed to as
a fair licensing price.” Had it been unreasonable, they assumed that the parties
would not have agreed to it.217 The court applied this novel approach because
“the precise value of a trade secret may be difficult to determine.”218 However,
the overarching principle is that “by sanctioning the acquisition, use, and
disclosure of another’s valuable, proprietary information by improper means,
trade secret law minimizes ‘the inevitable cost to the basic decency of society
when one . . . steals from another.’”219
Other less common methods of determining damages in trade secret cases
include lost profits and unjust enrichment.220 Lost profits can be a logical
approach to formulating damages as it attempts to formulate the profits that
would have been made if no misappropriation had occurred.221 In Salsbury
Laboratories, Inc. v. Merieux Laboratories, Inc. the Court took the sales made
by the defendant and awarded the plaintiff the profits they would have made if
they had made the lost sales.222 This approach can be difficult logistically as it
is not always clear what lost profits would be when the misappropriated
information is not a traditional trade secret.223 Unjust enrichment is a simpler
proposition for most courts and provides a remedy when lost profits would be
impractical.224 Neither of these approaches is logically applied to the
misappropriation of PAR data and so they will not be discussed at length here.

Id.
Id.
216
Id. at 509.
217
Id. at 512.
218
Id. at 510–11.
219
DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 864, 881 (Cal. 2003)
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974)).
220
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(4) (1985).
221
See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Foundation Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226, 1243–44
(8th Cir. 1994).
222
See Salsbury Laboratories, Inc. v. Merieux Laboratories, Inc., 735 F. Supp.
1555, 1573 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
223
See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Proper Measure and
Elements of Damages for Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 11 A.L.R. 4TH Art. 11
(1982).
224
Id.
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CONCLUSION: FINDING A WORKABLE SOLUTION
After years of pleadings and discovery, the Grand Sierra Resort and the
Peppermill eventually met in court.225 Ultimately, the jury was not convinced
that theoretical hold percentages were trade secrets.226 However, the Grand
Sierra Resort quickly appealed this decision based upon issues that arose
throughout litigation and the jury instructions given by the court. This appeal is
currently pending before the Nevada Supreme Court with oral arguments to be
heard at a later date. This case presents a number of issues of first impression
for the court to decide regarding trade secret law in the state of Nevada.
Based upon case law and the reasoning presented above, the Nevada
legislature should enshrine in Nevada law several crucial concepts. First, trade
secret cases are highly fact-specific and assumptions either way should not be
made. Nonetheless, a trade secret must not be quickly ascertainable or be so
“self-revealing” as to be ascertainable “at a glance.”227 Additionally, whether a
secret can be reverse engineered is immaterial to this trade secret determination
unless the defendant claims to have actually reverse engineered the trade secret
instead of obtaining it improperly.228 Assuming these elements are met, the
information must also be protected by common, reasonable security measures
to protect the alleged trade secret.229
When a trade secret is obtained by “(a) [t]heft;(b) [b]ribery; (c)
[m]isrepresentation; (d) [w]illful breach or willful inducement of a breach of a
duty to maintain secrecy; (e) [w]illful breach or willful inducement of a breach
of a duty imposed by common law, statute, contract, license, protective order or
other court or administrative order; and (f) [e]spionage through electronic or

See Jason Hidalgo, Jury Rules in Favor of Peppermill in Grand Sierra Resort
Trade Secrets Case, RENO GAZETTE-J. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.rgj.com/story/
money/gaming/2016/01/27/jury-clears-peppermill-grand-sierra-resort-trade-secretscase/79408290/.
226
See generally id; see also Complaint, supra note 2, at 5 (defining theoretical
hold percentages).
227
See Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., No. 08 C 5427, 2012 WL 74319, at 19
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that trade secret protection is applicable assuming
the secret does “not involve self-revealing information that any user or passer-by
sees at a glance”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993)
(specifying that the protected information need not “be unascertainable at all by
proper means, but only that they not be readily or quickly ascertainable by such
means”); Nat’l Instrument Labs., Inc. v. Hycel, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (D.
Del. 1979) (stating that secrets that are “ascertainable at a glance” will lose
protections); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding that
cargo container, available on the open market and accessible to defendant for
inspection, was a protectable trade secret because there was no evidence that the
“construction of which was ascertainable at a glance”).
228
AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 973 (8th
Cir. 2011).
229
E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1970).
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other means,”230 the factfinder should assume a rebuttable presumption that the
information constitutes a trade secret and has been misappropriated. Cases
should not end as soon as the misconduct is shown, but the presumption should
be strong.
Next, the plaintiff should not be required to show that the defendant used
the secret or gained financially from it when misappropriation has been
established. Ruling otherwise would reward the misappropriator of the secret
and place an unfair burden on the wronged party. For these same reasons, the
plaintiff should only be required to show that the misappropriated trade secret
has positive value to them. The trade secret obviously has value to the party
who misappropriated it, so no more analysis should be required.
Finally, as trade secret cases are so fact specific, the finder of fact should
be free to determine damages under any theory that is appropriate. This will
allow a wide variety of theories to be considered by the judge or jury and for
them to reach the most equitable results, and when necessary, take punitive
action against the misappropriating party. Likewise, the defendant would still
have the appellate courts to turn to for redress if the damages entered against
them are unreasonable.
Upon hearing the Jury Verdict, Bill Paganetti, the Peppermill’s General
Manager said to the media, “We are extremely pleased with the verdict. Once
again, we express our apologies to the gaming community for our mistakes.”231
As there was no affirmative guidance on the topic at hand in Nevada, a
deliberate, multi-year effort to steal valuable information from competitors was
reduced to a “mistake” made and was excused with a short apology. If juries
are armed with proper instructions based on clearly established caselaw, then
they will be empowered and confident enough to return appropriate verdicts.
With this adjustment to existing Nevada law, any company that is able to cheat
their competitors will not be able to cheat the law and the corporation who was
one of the largest slot cheats in gaming history will not escape the
consequences of their actions.

230
231

NEV. REV. STAT § 600A.030(1) (2016).
Hidalgo, supra note 225.

